Re: [Full-disclosure] HTTP AUTH BASIC monowall

["Jason Coombs" <jasonc@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Brian Eaton wrote:
> I'd like to see their process
> changed so that it included a more
> serious check into the business
> whose web site they are verifying.

This makes no sense at all, and is simply impossible within the DNS system. 
Furthermore, all verification done by any CA can be easily fooled. Only fools 
trust any CA.

What's wrong with expecting the end-user to be able to think clearly enough to 
find out what the *actual* trustworthy public key *actually is* for 
communicating with the *authentic* entity that the end-user wishes to 
communicate?

Three changes are required:

1. Do away with CA's entirely. Immediately. No sunset period.

2. Every entity that possesses a key pair makes a minimal effort to communicate 
their authentic public key to the people with whom they expect to communicate.

3. Give end-users a simple way to fixate trust within their client software to 
just the *single* public key that they have reason to believe is associated 
with the entity with whom they intend to communicate, and revoke client 
software's existing open-ended CA-mediated trust model, putting an immediate 
stop to it entirely.

The only reason this is not done is that Verisign's multimillions in revenue 
around their CA-related business, and their future business plans involving 
'security' in general, would cease to exist.

Reliable (and cost-free) security based on common sense would take its place, 
but nobody really wants security, do they? People just want things that are 
complicated so they can learn secret voodoo business trade secrets and grow new 
business ventures.

People who really want security already have it, so distrust anyone who claims 
to be able to sell it to you.

Regards,

Jason Coombs
jasonc@xxxxxxxxxxx

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