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Re: [Full-disclosure] Sony: No firewall and no patches
- To: Craig Miskell <craig@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <full-disclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Full-disclosure] Sony: No firewall and no patches
- From: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 12 May 2011 14:10:23 +0000
> On 11/05/11 23:05, phocean wrote:
> > Also, if you filter (and you should) both inbound and outbound
> > traffic, how do you allow legitimate responses to the server?
> I think Roland said earlier that outbound connections from these boxes
> should be going out another interface, presumably (my presumption)
> through a stateful firewall of some kind, because ACLs wouldn't be sufficient.
>
> This is perhaps the aspect that has been missed in this discussion (mentioned
> once, not particularly picked up on, and not really noted again). It
> eliminates
> many of the concerns of using ACLs over stateful.
Actually, the stateless solution was to just ACL via "known good" source ports.
And this was a large part of my original response of the value of firewalls in
front of a server. Limiting outbound traffic to responses to valid initiated
traffic is an important security control, specifically because the "ACL's
wouldn't be sufficient."
The examples I was going to tally up for Roland were any number of SQL
injection attacks where tftp and ftp command files were created (in this case,
by some tool that I presume created .cmd files just like we all used to do with
"echo >>") to get other toolsets. These requests failed as the SQL box
couldn't make outbound connections. There was no capability for the attacker
to initiate another remote connection to craft a response to.
I was actually going to try to get detailed information from way back where
Code Red propagation was avoided by outbound connection attempts as well, but I
don't really see the value in doing that at this point. I also had Slammer
research where I tested ISA's resilience to blocking outbound UDP 1434
connections, but I think it suffices to say that there are many, many valid
examples of why stateful inspection of traffic is valuable and adds security in
depth.
I had some other responses as well, but I have to bolt. I'll make sure to
catch up on the rest of the responses before I do so as well.
t
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