On Wed, Apr 09, 2014 at 09:59:59PM -0400, Peter Malone wrote:
> Unless I'm mistaken, the following memcmp is vulnerable to a remote
> timing attack.
> https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/ssl/ssl_lib.c#L1974
> static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b)
> {
> if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version)
> return(1);
> if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length)
> return(1);
> return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length));
> }
Not used anywhere though, just a corpse lying around in the code.
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