[FD] Ivanti Workspace Control local privilege escalation via Named Pipe

["Securify B.V. via Fulldisclosure" <fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

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Ivanti Workspace Control local privilege escalation via Named Pipe
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Yorick Koster, August 2018

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Abstract
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It was found that Ivanti Workspace Control allows a local (unprivileged)
attacker to run arbitrary commands with Administrator privileges. This
issue can be exploited by spawning a new Composer process, injecting a
malicious thread in this process. This thread connects to a Named Pipe
and sends an instruction to a service to launch an attacker-defined
application with elevated privileges.

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Tested versions
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This issue was successfully verified on Ivanti Workspace Control version
10.2.700.1 & 10.2.950.0.

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Fix
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This issue was resolved in Ivanti Workspace Control version 10.3.10.0.

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Details
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https://www.securify.nl/advisory/SFY20180802/ivanti-workspace-control-local-privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe.html


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