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[FD] Hyland OnBase 19.x and below - CSRF
- To: "fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx" <fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: [FD] Hyland OnBase 19.x and below - CSRF
- From: Adaptive Security Consulting via Fulldisclosure <fulldisclosure@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 02 Sep 2020 15:08:54 +0000
CVSSv3.1 Score
-------------------------------------------------
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Vendor
-------------------------------------------------
Hyland Software - (https://www.hyland.com/en/ and https://www.onbase.com/en/)
Product
-------------------------------------------------
Hyland OnBase
All derivatives based on OnBase
Versions Affected
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All versions up to and prior to OnBase Foundation EP1 (tested: 19.8.9.1000) and
OnBase 18 (tested: 18.0.0.32). OnBase Foundation EP2 and OnBase Foundation EP3
were not available to test, but Hyland's response indicates that they are not
likely to have fixed the vulnerability.
Credit
-------------------------------------------------
Adaptive Security Consulting
Vulnerability Summary
-------------------------------------------------
Hyland OnBase's web client allows cross-site request forgery on the login page
allowing an attacker to authenticate a user utilizing known credentials,
allowing the attacker to gather data about the user, perform spoofing, and
other activities.
Technical Details
-------------------------------------------------
Hyland OnBase's web login process fails to utilize a CSRF token, allowing an
attacker to authenticate a victim utilizing attacker-known credentials (such as
the default credentials "manager:wstinol" and "hsi:wstinol") when not using
federated authentication. Once authenticated, the victim would be performing
actions on-behalf of the attacker or the attacker can leverage the XSSi
vulnerabilities to extract data from OnBase remotely, bypassing cross origin
policies.
Solution
-------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, attempts to notify Hyland of the vulnerabilities have been
rebuffed as not being something that they have to fix since fixing
vulnerabilities, according to the Director of Application Security, is
"creating custom code" and no known fix is in place. It is recommended that
users utilize federated authentication or, failing that, strong credential
management processes to mitigate the risk of exploitation, and ensure that all
default credentials are changed.
Timeline
-------------------------------------------------
07 May 2019 - Adaptive Security Consulting discovered a series of
vulnerabilities in medical records management and search applications being
considered by our client
15 May 2019 - The client was provided with the results of the assessment,
including POCs for a number of high and critical vulnerabilities
12 July 2019 - Client asked for more information and demonstrations
01 October 2019 - Client asked to test latest version of Hyland software
15 October 2019 - Client was informed that EP1 contained many of the same
vulnerabilities
March 2020 - Client contacted Hyland and spoke with the Director of Application
Security who said that fixing vulnerabilities was "writing custom code" and
that Hyland "doesn't write custom code"
21 April 2020 - Adaptive Security Consulting attempted to contact Hyland's
Application Security Team via email on behalf of client, but attempts were
ignored
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